NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL
LAW IN THE EEC ON THE EVE OF BRITISH ENTRY
P. Jorm Kozymis*
The legal aspects of European integration are of interest to the American lawyer
both for practical and theoretical reasons. In advising clients who export or operate
in Europe, he needs to be aware of at least the main features of the new common
legal system, principally regulatory in nature, which is rapidly expanding in the
EEC and of the inter-relationship between it and the national legal systems. If he
is serving the government or an international organization in a capacity touching
upon international trade, he is required to acquire an even deeper understanding of
how this new system of law functions. The prospective enlargement of the EEC, engulfing especially the United Kingdom, a traditional base of American operations in
Europe, underscores the practical utility of knowing more about the EEC. Furthermore, the prospect of the United States participating with Europe in a broader
Atlantic Community is not as remote as it used to be and the EEC integration
experience can provide a valuable model for a broader organization.
On the theoretical level, the EEC is probably the most intriguing and innovative legal creation of recent times. Admittedly the imperfect offspring of a
compromise between federative ideals and nationalist realities, it defies classification.
Its legal system is neither international nor municipal, neither confederate nor
federal in nature, but a little bit of each. In other words, it is sui generis, to the
despair of the taxonomists and to the detriment of its logical consistency and cohesion. This elusiveness of characterization can be understood and accepted,
however, when one realizes that the EEC is but a step in the direction of a
gradual, continuous process of integration which is gathering momentum and
becoming increasingly irreversible.1
I
THE Ro~M TREATY: BETWEEN TREATY AND CONsTITUTION

It is not within the scope of my presentation to go into the details of the arguments
over the precise nature of this hermaphrodite, conceived under the sign of Hermes,

the God of Commerce, but I will explain briefly why the Rome Treaty is more than
a traditional international agreement and less than a federal constitution.2
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The present article is a slightly expanded version of an address to the Institute on the Expansion
of the Common Market held at the Duke Law School on April 14-15, 1972, under the auspices of the
Law School and the A.B.A. Section on Comparative and International Law. The bibliographical
references are limited to the more recent publications and authorities in this field.
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The legal system of the EEC is discussed in HAY, supra note x, at 42-1os; Sasse, The Common
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The Rome Treaty is more than a treaty for a number of reasons.
First, many of its provisions are directly applicable within the member states,
creating rights and obligatons in private persons to be recognized and enforced
by national courts irrespective of municipal law. They are thus more than selfexecuting treaty-type provisions.
Second, and most important, the Rome Treaty has set up independent supranational institutions which are endowed with extensive original legislative, executive,
and judicial powers. This has been interpreted as involving the transfer of some
sovereign powers4 and not merely the delegation of authority coupled with the

assumption of obligations by independent states. The Treaty and the nbrms created
by these institutions, which often are also directly applicable within the member
states, constitute a new legal order separate from, and in fact superior to, the
national legal systems.
Third, the scope of powers placed in supranational hands, even though limited
to trade and economic matters, is far broader than that of any comparable international organization.6
Fourth, the institutional structure of the EEC is such that no member state is in
a position to block the exercise of such powers in most instances.
And fifth, the negotiations leading to the Treaty, the text of the Treaty itself, and
the subsequent actions and pronouncements of the member states demonstrate ar
intent to move toward a more closely knit community of peoples rather than an
alliance of states.7 As a result, the Treaty is not being interpreted strictly, under the
traditional rules applicable to treaties, but rather expansively, with a view to giving
full effect to its objectives.
On the other hand, the Rome Treaty falls short of being a federal constitution.
To begin with, the supranational powers of the EEC relate only to trade and economic matters. The constitutional and political structures of the member states remairv
intact and their governments retain considerable freedom in the conduct of foreign
relations and of internal, non-economic affairs. In a sense, it is as if the United States
Market: Between

International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695 (1966); A. GREEN, POLITICAL IN-

463-90 (x969).
' See Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: The Development of a Community
Concept, I9 INT'L & Cois. L.Q. 257-61 (197o).
'See text accompanying notes 45-52, infra.
TEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE 1-37, 414-33,

' See Korowicz, Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law,

1o2 ACADEmI

DE DRoIr

i,io8 (ig6i).
'The German Zollverein and the Danube Commission, which were created in the second half of the
nineteenth century, possessed very limited powers and functioned essentially on a technical level. See
HAY, supra note i, at 4-5, 29'On recent progress in this area, see Note, The European Communities-The Perspective of
European Integration, 42 CuRaRNT NoTEs ON INT L AF'AIas 43, 47-48 (197i); Jacqu6 & Knaub, Le
Parlement Europeen, 7 RvsE; TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EURo fFN [Rev. Tvan. DR. EuR.] 714, 715-17
(1971). The views of the Commission are summarized in its Opinion on the Applications for Membership of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway which appears in English translation as
CCH Cosss. MxT. REP., Supp. 124, at 1-8, 34-35 (1970). France is reported to insist that the new
European "political secretariat" be located in Paris while some of the other states, including England as
a prospective member, would prefer Brussels. N.Y. Times, March 20, X972, at I, col. 8.
INTERNATIONAL, REcUEIL DES CouRs (I)
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Government were vested with only the commerce power. The Rome Treaty contains

very little, if anything, that pertains to the system of government of the states and
to the fundamental rights of the people. It must be noted here, however, that all
member states but France are parties to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, prepared under the auspices of
the Council of Europe, which goes a long way in guaranteeing individual rights.,
Even in the economic sphere, the Treaty does not adequately provide for full
economic and monetary union and it is understood that it will be revised accordingly
in the next few years, assuming a continuing consensus of the states.9
The people of the member states have not participated in any direct way in the
preparation of the Rome Treaty and in its continued application. The adoption
procedure used was that for a normal treaty and no attempt was made to give it
constitutional force internally. Furthermore, it is amendable again only as a treaty
and the people have no direct power to shape its future content?0 There does exist
a European Assembly, commonly referred to as the Parliament, which consists of
appointed members from the state legislatures,"1 but it is essentially an advisory
and deliberative body without real powers other than, in an exceptional case, to force
resignation of the EEC Commission by a two-thirds vote. 12 While the Treaty calls
for the eventual direct election of the members of the European Parliament 8 and
the Parliament has already made a proposal to the EEC Council to that effect, 14 the
Council has not yet acted; and its unanimous consent to the change is required."
Another significant difference between the Rome Treaty and a constitution is
that the EEC is not given direct authority to tax or to raise armies or maintain a
police force. The purse and the sword have been zealously kept in the hands of the
member states. Some progress has been made, however, in the financing of the
EEC budget. During the transitional period, the EEC depended on contributions
213 U.N.T.S. 22,

regitered August X, 1955.

On the problems of proceeding with monetary and economic union, and on the recent progress made
in dealing with them, see Maas, The Powers of the European Community and the Achievement of the
Economic and Monetary Union, 9 Comm. MKT. L. Rnv. 2 (1972); Everling, Institutional Aspects of a
European Economic and Monetary Union, 8 Comms. MxT. L. R.v. 495 (1971); Carreau, La Communautl
Economique Europlene Face aux Problmes Monitaires, 7 RFv. TRm. DR. Etm. 586 (971); 2 CCH
Com-M. MYT. Rp.
9358, 94o6 (1970), 9415 (I97I). For the text of the Werner Plan, see 7 Rav.
Tim. DR. Eas. 687 (197). On the revitalization of the drive toward such a union, following the
currency crisis of late 1971, see Press Release of The European Community Information Service, March 29,
1972, reproduced in 2 CCH Comm. MxT. REP.
9502 (1972); Wall St. J., March 8, 1972, at 6, col. 2.

The Council has already started a practice of issuing annual reports on the economic situation in
the Community and establishing detailed guidelines on action to be taken. For the first such report, fee
2 OCH Comm. MkT. REP. 9468 (,971).
10
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 1 CCH COMN MxT. REP.
5449, 298 U.N.T.S. 14-94 [hereinafter cited as Rome Treaty], art. 236.
"Rome Treaty, art. 138 (I).
" Rome Treaty, art. 144.
3
" Rome Treaty, art. 138(3).
i I CCH Comm. MitT. REP. 4306 (1967).
'= Rome Treaty, art. 138(3).
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from the member states and on a portion of the agriculture levies.'

Under the new
system which became effective ini97i, the EEC has its own resources consisting of
(i) all agricultural levies, and eventually all customs duties, collected at the EEC
borders, less a ioo collection charge; (ii) state contributions; and (iii) beginning
17
with 1975, a percentage of up to one point of the value-added tax of the states.
Incidentally, most of the EEC's resources, which are approaching two billion dollars
annually, are expended in support of the agricultural program.' s
Turning to the EEC institutions, it is obvious tchat they do not constitute a
complete federal government. The Commission, embodiment of the federative
ideal and guardian of the Treaty, is independent of the states on a long term basis 9
and is entrusted with a complex of executive, administrative, legislative, and quasijudicial powers. The reach of such powers, however, is rather short because all
important decisions are to be made by the EEC Council of Ministers. The Commission is thus largely a technocratic institution and the fact that it is not accountable
to any elected body was used by the Gaullists, in an almost derisive manner, to
downgrade it in seeking to limit its authority.20 The EEC Council of Ministers,
which holds supreme power in the Community, is made up of ministers currently in
office, one from each member state.2 While the Council is an EEC organ having
powers of its own, and not merely an intergovernmental conference, it inevitably
reflects the views of the governments of the states rather than of the Community
as a whole. The major decisions of the Council of Ministers require unanimity"2
and most others, a weighted supermajority. s Consequently, the Council is particularly vulnerable to centrifugal and sectional pressures. It was in this crucial
forum that France almost was able to paralyze community progress in the mid-

10
Rome

Treaty, art. 200. See Sertoli, The Structure and Financial Activities of the European Re-

gional
Communities, 26 LAw & Cozerasrn. PROB. 515, 529 (ig6i). See also infra note 17.
17 Rome Treaty, art. 2o. See X CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 5012 (197); Great Britain, THE UNrrED
KINGDOM AND THE EtmoP'EAN Cozsim mms Cmnd. No. 4715, at 23-24, 41-42 (1971).
18 The common agricultural policy, which is based on a price support system, is discussed in Olmi,
Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets at the Stage of the Single Market, 5 comm. MKT. L. REv.
359 (i968); Megret, La Politique Agricole Commune, 7 REv. TRIM. DR. Etu. 457 (1971); Megret,
Les Developpements de la Politique Agricole Commune depuis le lerJanvier 1970, 7 Rav. Trim. DR. Etm.
745 (197r). The price support system has not been working very well, resulting in high prices to the
consumer, exorbitant profits to the owners of large farms and big surpluses. The Council of Ministers recently adopted guidelines aimed at improving agricultural structures, encouraging the withdrawal of labor from cultivation of the land, and providing some minimum support to the small
farmers. See Press Release from the Council of the European Communities, No. 6o8/72, Brussels,
March 24, 1972, reproduced in 2 CCH COMM. MK. REP. 9503 (972);N.Y. Tirne, March 2o, 1972, at
59, cOl. 7; Wall St. J., January 31, 1972, at 20, col. 2.
" Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities effective July 1, 1967, art. io-iu, i CCH. CoMM. Mt. Rap.
5115, 5126-67, JouNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTAfS EUROPfENNES, July 13, 1967, at 152/5-152/6.
20 See H. STEINER & D. VAcrs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRoBLEMs 1169-71 (i968).
" The Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities
effective July 1, 1967, art. 2, 1 CCH Comm. MET. REP.
5115, 5i18, JOURNAL OFMsCIE. DES COMMUNAUTPS EUOIENNES, July 13, x967, at 152/4.
2
" See, e.g., Rome Treaty, arts. 50, 100, 149, 223(3), 235 & 238.
" See, e.g., Rome Treaty, arts. 43(2), 54(2), 75(I), 92(3)(d), 101, 113(4) & 114.
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i96o's. 4 Since then the EEC -has made enormous progress, but France has attached
what amounts to a unilateral reservation to the Rome Treaty to the effect that all
decisions of the Council that affect important national interests must be taken unanimously2 5 This important issue is presently unresolved,2" and if France manages
to have its way in the future, consistent with the Gaullist latter-day view of the
EEC as a confederation of independent, sovereign states, then the crucial step would
not have been taken and the point of no return toward federalization would not
have been reached.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is probably the most federal
of the EEC institutions in that it has supreme jurisdiction and authority to interpret
and, in some instances, apply the Community law. 7 At the same time, there is an
important gap in its jurisdiction. Private parties claiming violation of Community
law by the member states have no direct right to appeal or even petition for certiorari
to the Court of Justice. Instead, they must depend on the willingness of the national
courts to refer community law issues to the European' Court.0 8 There is also a hole
in the Court's authority in that, in article 177 reference cases, the Court may not
rule directly on the compatibility of national law with Community law. The most it
can do is to interpret or to pass upon the validity of Community law in the abstract.
2

From July of x965 through January of 1966, France had no representative on the Council, dem-

onstrating its unhappiness over lack of progress in the agricultural sector and expressing its reservations
about the exercise of supranational powers by the institutions of the Community. In many respects, the
more significant work of the Community institutions was suspended during this period. See H. Samt
& D. VAGrs, supra note 2o, at 1169; E. Samr & P. HAY, LAw AN) IN sTIT-UONS IN THF ATLANTIC ArEA
6
Io6-o (19 7).
" The crisis of x965 ended in the so-called Luxembourg Compromise. The pertinent language of this
Compromise reads as follows:
"x. In the event of decisions that can be adopted by majority on the proposal of the Commission, when
very important interests of one or several partners are at stake, the members of the Council will attempt,
within a reasonable period of time, to arrive at solutions that could be adopted by all members of the
Council in respect of their mutual interests and those of the Community in accordance with Article 2
of the Treaty.
2. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that, when very important
interests are concerned, discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement has been reached.
3. The six delegations acknowledge that a difference of opinion remains on what should be done in the
event that conciliation cannot be fully attained."
Reproduced in E. STrMs'
& P. HAY, supra note 24, at xzi-i2. See also H. SaEINr. & D. VA'Ts, stpra
note 2o, at 1171-13; Lambert, The Constitutional Crids 1965-66, 4 J. Comstm. MxrT. STUD. 195 (1966).
" It is particularly disappointing to find an approving reference to this de facto unanimity requirement
in the British White Paper of 1971 (supra note 17, at 8). The extent to which the British are committed to this position is not clear. It has been reported that during the Pompidou-Heath talks of
March, X972, the British were in favor of strong and energetic Community institutions and broad
Community powers. N.Y. Times, March 20, 1972, § I, at I, col. 8.

For a study of the role of the Court of Justice through a detailed
27 Rome Treaty, arts. 164-88.
analysis of its case law, see A. GRroN, supra note 2.
28
Rome Treaty, art. 177. See Mashaw, Ensuring the Observance of Law in the Interpretation and
Application of the EEC Treaty: The Role and Functioning of the Renvoi d' Interpretation under Article
177, 7 CoMm. MxT. L. Rv. 258, 262, 265 (970); Hay, Supremacy of Community Law in National
Courts, x6 Am. J. Cosss. L. 524, 530-31 (1968).
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It is then incumbent uporf the -national courts to refuse to enforce national law if

it conflicts with Community law. 9
With respect to the enforcement of Community law, the impotence of the Community institutions is even dearer. There is no Community enforcement machinery,
and it is only through an obligation imposed on the states that Community law
is expected to be put into effect. 0 Even in the extreme situation where the Court
of Justice finds a Treaty violation by a member state in proceedings instituted by
the Commission or another member state,' compliance with the decision is left
to the good grace of the offending state.3 2 No supremacy clause is included in the
Treaty which formally invalidates conflicting state legislation; there are no specific
sanctions imposable under the Treaty for state violations even of an economic, let
alone military, nature; and there are no explicit provisions against withdrawal.
Hence, it is possible for a state to disengage itself from the Community, subject
only to whatever consequences may be incurred under the international law of
treaties. 3 It must be pointed out, however, that as a practical matter, the closer
and larger the Community, and the more comprehensive the package of benefits and
obligations associated with it, the more difficult it would be for a state to return to
a condition of isolation. The economic and political price of withdrawal would be
prohibitive. It is noteworthy that despite the misgivings of some governments,
especially that of France, about the supranational expansionism of the EEC institutions, no member state defied the Community to the end. The flexibility shown
by EEC institutions in taking into account the special problems of the member
states is to be credited in part for this record of compliance. The French Conseil
d' Etat probably came close to evading its obligations under the Treaty by persistently
failing to refer Community law issues to the Court of Justice as required by article
177, either by focusing on the national law aspects of the particular case34 or by
relying on the "acte clair" doctrye," but it finally came through with a referral,
" See Mashaw, supra note 28, at 266-70; Hay, supra note 28, at 539-43; Buxbaum, Article z77 of
the Rome Treaty as a FederalizingDevice, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1041, 104 n.i9 (1969).
o See Rome Treaty, art. 5.
8 Rome Treaty, arts. 169-70.
a Rome Treaty, art. 171.
11
But see Rome Treaty, art. 240, which provides that the Treaty "is concluded for an unlimited
period," which would imply the absence of the right of unilateral denunciation. See also the conclusions
of an Advocate General of the European Court in [Court Decisions 1961-i966 Transfer Binder] CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. 8o3 (1964). It is to be noted that Rome Treaty, art. 25g, requires that all disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty should be resolved through the methods provided
for in the treaty.
14 See, e.g., Syndicat g3nral des fabricants de semoules de France, [1968] D.S. Jur. 285 (Conseil
d' Etat); Hay, supra note 28, at 549-50. For cases in the French Cour de Cassation and other courts,
see Buxbaum, supra note 29, at 1045, n. 19. For further discussion of this point, see Hay, supra note T,
at 134-35; Mashaw, supra note 28, at 430-34.
" See, e.g., Re Societ6 des Petroles Shell-Berre, 84:2 Gazette du Palait 35 (Conseil d' Etat), 3
Comm. MKr. L. Razv. 462 (1964). For other such cases of the Conseil d'Etat, see Hay, supra note 28,
at 533, n. 52. For a discussion of the meaning and implications of this doctrine, see Hay, supra note 28,
at 532-35; P. HAY, supra note I, at 136-38. Mashaw, supra note 28, at 278-85; Buxbaum, supra note 29,
at 1045-46; Chevallier, Note on Soc. des Petroles Shell-Berre, 3 CoMm. MKT. L. Rav. 100, 105-57 (965).
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to the relief of all concerned 8
II
COMMUNITY LAw AND NATIONAL LAW
With this introduction, we turn to the main topic: the source, form, and content
of Community law and its relation to national law at the present stage of evolution
of the Europeanization process.

As was indicated earlier, the legislative function of the EEC is shared by two
institutions: the Commission and, for more important matters, the Council of
Ministers. Quite often these institutions must act together, with the Comniission
proposing and the Council approving. What kind of legal rules may be put into
effect? A look at article 189 shows that these institutions may adopt regulations and
directives, make decisions, and formulate recommendations and opinions.
The so-called regulation is the principal form of legislation in the Community.
It is of general and direct application within the states. A directive, on the other
hand, binds the states to which it is addressed only as to the result to be achieved
but leaves the means to them. Directives are generally used to produce desired
legislative ends but are not drafted in the form of statutes. Decisions bind directly
the addressees, be they states or private parties, and they are mostly in the nature of
administrative rather than legislative acts, especially when addressed to private
parties. Recommendations and opinions have no binding force.
Probably the most debated issue in Community law has been the extent to which
acts other than regulations are directly applicable within the member states.87 While
it is recognized that the Treaty provisions themselves often, and that regulations
almost invariably, are directly applicable and have a direct internal effect, the question
whether directives and decisions addressed to the states can have a direct internal
effect had not received a uniform answer until recent decisions of the Court of
Justice disposed of this issue in the affirmative. In three cases decided in late 1970,
Grad,a Lesage, 0 and Haselhurst,40 the Court held that a Council decision proAccording to a former French Advocate General of the Court of Justice, the Conseil d' Etat has
been acting reasonably under Article 177, and both the "acte clair" doctrine and the "independent

national grounds" approach are compatible with the reference procedure, if properly applied. Lagrange,
The European Court of Justice and Natilonal Courts, 8 CoMm. MKr. L. REV. 33 (xgx). See also,
Lassalle, L'application de l'art. 177 due traiti CEE par le Conseil d' Etat francais, xx RivisrA Di Dnurro
E.tMOPEO 192 (1971).
" Syndicat Nat'l du Commerce Extfrieur des C*&ales v. Office Nat'l Interprofessionnel des Cfrdales,
16 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de laCour 1233 (Cour de Justice de laCommunit6 Europene i97o (hereinafter cited as Recueil de la Cour], 2 CCH CoMm. MKT.REP. 18122 (1970).
" For a good review of this issue, see Bebr, supra note 3, at 257 (1970). See also, Brinkhorst, Case
Law: Salgoil v. Ministry of Foreign Commerce of Italy, 6 Comm. MKT.L. RaV. 478 (%969).
"8 Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 16 Recueil de la Cour 825, 2 CCH Commet. MKT. R ,. 8107

(1970).
" Transports Lesage & Cie v. Hauptzollamt Freiburg, x6 Recueil de la Cour 86x, 2 CCH Commt. MXT.
RP. 8io8 (i970).

" 0 Haselhorst v. Finanzamt Diisseldorf-Altstadt, x6 Recueil de ]a Cour 881, 2
REP. 8IO9 (1970).

CCH COMm. MitT.
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hibiting the cumulation of the value added tax and special taxes in the transportation
industry had direct effect within Germany and could be invoked by private parties.
In the SA CE case,41 decided about the same time, a Council directive addressed to
Italy, relating to the prohibition against imposing internal charges having an effect
equivalent to customs duties, was again held to have direct effects. The Court appears
to use a functional test and does not limit itself to the form of the Community act
involved. The decision on direct effect hinges upon whether the act in question,
by its nature, context, and wording, imposes dear and unconditional obligations
which are capable of creating rights in private parties by reflection. It has been
said that this position of the Court, which obviously tends to extend the ambit
of Community law as such, shows a dynamic-progressive rather than a 4historical2
textual interpretation of the Treaty and is bound to accelerate integration.
The Court's expansive interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Treaty,
almost as if it were a constitution, is underscored in a 1969 case between France and
the EEC Commission.43 In that case, France sought the annulment of a Commission decision which prohibited France from maintaining a preferential rediscount
rate for commercial paper used to finance export credits. The Commission claimed
that this constituted state aid which was prohibited. France charged that the Commission exceeded its authority and acted ultra vires because the preferential export
rediscount rate, and the general rate to which it was closely connected, came within
the realm of France's monetary policy and balance of payments decision-making,
which were not within the coverage of the Treaty. The Court rejected the French
contention, pointing out that the powers vested in the EEC to coordinate economic
policies and to treat exchange policies as a matter of common interest would be
frustrated if the states were entirely free, under the pretext that their action related
solely to monetary policy, to deviate from the Treaty obligations.
This case appears to support the view that the Community and its institutions
possess such implied powers as are necessary and proper in order to give effect to
the Treaty provisions.44 This is quite important in the interpretation of article
235 of the Treaty which provides that "if any action by the Community appears
necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of
the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers
of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate
provisions." If the existence of implied powers is recognized, as in Commission v.
France, the use of the cumbersome procedure of article 235 apparently would be
"'S.A.C.E. s.p.a. v. Italian Ministry of Finance, i6 Recueil de la Cour 1213, 2 CCH Coanr. MKr.
RE'. 8117 (1970).
384,
"See Brinkhorst, Case Law: S.A.C.E. v. Ministry of Finance of Italy, 8 Comme. MKT. L. REv.
386-92 (I97I).
" Commission of the Eur. Communities v. France, 15 Recueil de la Cour 523, 2 COCi Comms.MKT.
REP. 81o5 (1969). See Brinkhorst & Verougstraete, Case Law: Commission of the Eur. Communities
v. French Republic, 7 Comrm. Mxr. L. REV. 479, 483-89 (1970).
"See P. HAY,supra note i, at i85-91, E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 873-75.
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required only where new powers beyond the original treaty provisions are to be
created to implement the general Treaty objectives.
What is the status of the Rome Treaty and of the secondary direct Community

law in the legal systems of the member states? There are a few principles that are
beyond dispute. First, it is clear that the Treaty was duly adopted as such in all

member states. Second, there is no doubt that Community law emanates only from
the EEC and that the Community legal system is distinct from those of the states.
But is Community law merely separate and equal, or is it superior and supreme

in the case of conflict within national law of any kind?
This question can be viewed from two different perspectives. From the EEC viewpoint, the answer is clear. Despite the absence of a "supremacy clause" in the Treaty,
the Court of Justice has held, beginning with the famous early Van Gend & Loos45
and Costa48 cases and culminating in the case of InternationaleHandelsgesellschat47

of late i97o, that valid Community law is separate from and superior to national law
at all times and in all circumstances

s

In the latter case, a German enterprise was

contesting the validity of Council and Commission regulations which provided for
the forfeiture of bonds posted by exporters of agricultural products when the ex-

portation did not take place. One of the claims made by the plaintiff was that such
forfeiture was contrary to the German constitutional provisions protecting economic
freedom and requiring proportionality. The German Administrative Court was
inclined to agree but referred the case to the Court of Justice under article 177.
The European Court held that national constitutional law cannot be used to in-

validate Community legislation or to interfere with its effectiveness in the territory
of the member states.4" The case settles the supremacy argument. The Court went

further, however, and affirmed that it will respect the common constitutional
traditions of the member states not because of their status as such but because they

are part of the general principles of law which the Court must safeguard as the
unwritten law of the Community.
"' N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expedite van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Adm'n, 9 Recucil de
la Cour i, [Court Decisions 196x-1966 Transfer Binder] OCH Comm. MKT. RFP. 8oo8 (x963).
" Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica Impresa gih della Edison Volta [E.N.E.L], io Recueil de
]a Cour 1141, [Court Decisions 196x-i966 Transfer Binder] CCH. CoMm. MxT. RaP. 8023 (1964).
See, Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin of the Costa Cae,
63 ici. L. REv. 491 (965); Sasse, note 52, infra.
"Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr & Vorratsstelle, 16 Recueil de la Cour 1125, 2
CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
8126 (1970).
SRFor a careful analysis of the decided cases up to 1966, see Hay, supra note 1, at 153.75.
For earlier cases foreshadowing this result, see Stork v. High Authority of the Coal & Steel Commumity, 5 Recueil de la Cour 43 (z959); Enterprise I. Nold K.G. v. High Authority of the Coal & Steel
Community, 6 Recuell de la Cour 857 (596o); Sgarlata v. Commission of the EEC, ix Rccueil de la
Cour 279 (1965)-

60 This is quite remarkable development, especially in view of the fact that the Rome Treaty
makes explicit reference to the "general principles common to the laws of Member States" only in Article
215(2) as a source of the rules to govern the noncontractual liability of the Community. On the implications
of this aspect of the InternationaleHandelsgeseflschaft case, and of Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, x9
Recueil do la Cour 425, [Court Decisions x967-197o Transfer Binder] CCH CoMM. MKT. Rap. 8077
(1969), the only case where this question dearly came up, see Zulceg, Fundamental Rights and the Law
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From the national perspective, however, the domestic court may find itself in
a bind when the Community law conflicts with an internal law which is superior
to it under the national constitution. The problem arises because no member state
adopted the Rome Treaty as a supra-constitutional norm. In all member states,
the Treaty has at least the force of ordinary legislation. But what if subsequent internal legislation or another treaty is inconsistent with it and, more importantly, what
if the Treaty or secondary Community legislation violates the constitution of a
member state? From the EEC viewpoint, it is clear that a state is required to take
all measures to eliminate such conflict 1 But what should the national judge do?
In view of the internal status of the Treaty as such, the national judge has no choice
52
but to follow the hierarchy of the sources of law within his own system
It is probably in the Netherlands that the Rome Treaty enjoys the highest status.
Article 67 of the Dutch Constitution permits the delegation of legislative, administrative, and judicial powers to organizations founded upon the law of nations, and
article 66 expressly provides for the superiority of self-executing international agreements over internal legislation. The Dutch judge, who has no authority to review
the constitutionality of treaties (article 6o(3) of the Dutch Constitution), would have
no difficulty in recognizing the supremacy of Community law and in enforcing it
under article 66 of the constitution in case of conflict with any kind of internal
legislation 3 If one interprets these clauses of the Dutch Constitution to authorize
irrevocable transfers of powers, then even a subsequent inconsistent treaty would not
supersede the Rome Treaty. 4
In Belgium, the constitutionality of treaties is not reviewable by the courts, but
since treaties generally have no greater force than ordinary legislation, under tradiof the European Communities, 8 Comms. Mk. L. REV. 446, 453-61 (1971); Bebr, Law of the European
Communities and Municipal Law, 34 MoD. L. Rav. 481, 491-93 (197). See also, the written communication on 'The Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities" submitted on behalf
of the Court of Justice by judge Pescatore to the Parmliamentary Conference on Human Rights organized by the Council of Europe, reproduced in 9 Comm. MKsr. L. Rav. 73 (1972). For a more technical discussion of the question of the common general principles, see Lorenz, General Principles of Law:
Their Elaboration in the Court of justice of the European Communities, 13 Am. J. ComP. L. 1 (1964).
One of the important consequences of the recognition by the Court of Justice of the common constitutional traditions of the member states as a source of the basic law of the Community is that it reduces
the possibility that national courts in Germany and Italy might find that the transfer of powers to the
Community is contrary to their constitutions which do not permit the violation of fundamental rights
in any circumstance. GRauwixss-z arts. X9(2), 79(3) (Ger.); ITALiAN CONsr. art. 2. See Zuleeg, supra,
at 446-53.
' See P. HAY, supra note x,at 173.
5
See Sasse, The Common Market: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.. 695,
7r9 (r966).
"' See P. HAY,supra note x,at 271-72; Sasske, supra note 52, at 705-o6; Bebr, supra note 50, at 48586; E. STEaN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 54-57. It is interesting to note that a special procedure provided
for in article 63 of the Netherlands Constitution, requiring a % majority vote in the legislature for the
approval of international agreements which are in conflict with the constitution, was not used for the
Rome Treaty, apparently because of the belief that the terms of the treaty were not contrary to the constitution. See Van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and InternationalLaw, 58 Am. J.INT'L L. 88,
98-99, xo6 (1964).
" Cf. P. HAY, supra note x,at x64.
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tional Belgian practice the Rome Treaty is subject to being superseded by subsequent treaty or statute.55 A recent landmark decision of the Supreme Court of
Belgium, however, established judicially the supremacy of treaties over municipal
law and confirmed the limitation of national sovereignty under the Rome Treaty.
In the case of Belgium v. S. A. Fromageriefranco-suisse le Ski, an importer of dairy
products sued successfully for a refund of customs duties paid under a Belgian
law which allegedly was inconsistent with article 12 of the Rome Treaty.P0 The
Court of Justice had already decided, in an action by the Commission against Belgium,
that Belgium had violated article 12 of the Treaty,57 but subsequent Belgian legislation provided that duties already paid were not recoverable. Faced with a conflict
between the Treaty and subsequent inconsistent statutes, the Belgian court held first;
that the principle lex posterior derogat priori does not apply in this situation because
the treaty is not of the same nature as a statute, and second, that a self-executing
treaty prevails over inconsistent internal legislation because of the primacy of the
international legal order. The court did not stop here, however, but proceeded to
hold that the superiority of treaties applies a fortiori to the Rome Treaty which created
a new legal order for the benefit of which the member states have limited their
sovereignty. This recognition of the limitation of sovereignty could form the basis
of a further holding in the future that Belgium no longer has the power unilaterally
to adopt measurers of higher status (constitutional amendments or new treaties)
8
contrary to the Rome Treaty.5

In Luxembourg, the constitution authorizes the temporary delegation of legislative, judicial, or executive powers to international institutions (article 49-bis) but
contains no clause specifically relating to the internal status of treaties. The
Luxembourg Supreme Court, however, has generally recognized the superiority
of treaties over both prior and subsequent internal statutes, and the constitutionality
of treaties is not judicially reviewable.P9
The French situation is more complicated. Article 55 of the constitution provides
that treaties have an authority superior to that of statutes. According to the traditional view, the French practice which strictly prohibits judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation extends to the precedence of treaties over internal
legislation. ° The modem trend, however, appears to favor judicial consideration
" See Sasse, supra note 52, at 710-12; E. SrEiN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 57-63. A recent amendment of the Belgian Constitution (article 25 bis) provides that "the exercise of power may be conferred
by Treaty or by law on institutions of public international law." MoMnru BELGE 842! (Aug. 18,
1970). See Louis, L'Arficle 25 bis de la Constitution Beige, 1970 Rvu Do MARCi CO r N 40.
so 7 Rv. Tuma. DR. Eun. 494, 2 CCH Comm. MT. REP. 814T (x971) (Cour de Cassation, irO
Chambre, Belg.).
" Commission de la EEC v. Luxembourg & Belgique, xo Recueil de la Cour 1217 (,1964).
For a detailed analysis of the issues before the Belgian Supreme Court, see van der Meersch,
Suprdmadte du droit communautaire sur le droit vationa, 7 REv. Trum. DR. Eun. 423 (1971) (conclusions of the Attorney General of Belgium).
59
See Sasse, supra note 52, at 709-Io; Bebr, supra note 5o, at 486; E. ISTnN & P. HAY,supra note 24,
at 63.
" Sasse, supra note 52, at 708-09.
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of the compatibility of a statute with a treaty; 6 and in a 1970 case, Administration des
Contributions Indirectes v. Ramel,"2 the French Cour de Cassation unequivocally

refused to apply the French laws relating to quality control and taxation of wines to
imported Italian wine which met the Community standards, on the ground that
under article 55 of the constitution! international law prevails over municipal law
in this setting. Since the Community law involved was in the form of regulations
and decisions, this case appears to dispel any doubts about whether article 55 applies
03
to secondary Community law and not only to the Treaty itself.
Article 54 of the French Constitution sets up a procedure for preliminary review
by the Conseil Constitutionnel, at the request of the President, Prime Minister, or
President of an Assembly of the Parliament, of the constitutionality of proposed
international commitments. If the Conseil finds that they are iny conflict with the
constitution, then they may be ratified only if the constitution is amended. Following
the April 21, 197o, Decision of the EEC Council6" which established the new system
of financing the Community by replacement of state contributions with the Community's own resources," the EEC members signed a new treaty which increased
the budgetary powers of the European Assembly. 6 There was some political
opposition in France to this change, and the argument was made that the new system
violated the French Constitution, in particular article 3 which provides that "national
sovereignty belongs to the people who shall exercise it through their representatives"
and article 34 which requires that all taxation be imposed by law adopted by the
Parliament. It was also claimed that the new system was contrary to a traditional
principle of French public law that taxes may be imposed only by elected representatives.6 7 In these circumstances, the Prime Minister decided to refer the Treaty
and the Council decision to the Conseil Constitutionnel. The Conseil went out of
its way to uphold the constitutionality of the treaty and of the Council decision 6
It stressed that the Treaty, which was to be ratified as such, only modified the
distribution of powers among the organs of the Community and did not affect the
balance of relations between the Community and the states. As to the Council
decision, which in particular provided for the allocation to -the Community of a
portion of the value-added tax of the states, the Conseil treated it as merely an
implementing measure of the Community treaties which had already been ratified
and noted that its enforcement in France was subject to statutory approval under
"' Id. at 7o9; Hay, supra note 28, at 549-50.
02 1o

CoMm. MKr. L.R. 315 (1971). For a comment on this case, see Kovar & Tallon, infra note 67,

at 404-46.
08 See Sasse, supra note

52,

at 708. See also, note 68 infra.

"For the text of this decision, see 7 REv. Taim. DR. EuR.

237 (197).

" See note 17 supra.
" For the text of this treaty, see 7 REv. TRim. DR. Eo. 242 (197).
"' See Kovar & Tallon, The Application of Community Law in France in 1970, 8 Comm. MaT. L.
Rav. 402-04 (1971).
"8 For the text of Declaration of the Conseil in French and an English translation, see io Comm. Mxy.
L.R. 70-74 (1971). On the role of the Conseil Constitutionnel generally, see Waline, The Constitutional
Council of the French Republic, 12 Am. J. Comp. L. 483 (1963).
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article 53 of the French Constitution, which meant that the requirements of article
34 would be met. Consequently, the Decision did not affect the "essential conditions
of national sovereignty."69
In Germany, the Basic Law expressly provides for the transfer of sovereign
powers to international institutions (Grundgesetz article 24). On the other hand,
it also contains limitations on the delegation of powers (article 8o) and certain
fundamental principles are beyond constitutional amendment (article 79(3)). German courts and commentators have generally upheld the validity of the Treaty and
recognized the-transfer of sovereign powers to the Community, with the result that
the Treaty and Community acts are not in principle subject to review under German
constitution'al law. The only area of uncertainty at this time is whether the Community, in its exercise of the transferred powers, is free from the restraints of
the fundamental, unalterable rights guaranteed by the German Basic Law.10 The
recent acceptance by the Court of Justice of the constitutional traditions of the
member states as part of the unwritten law of the Community is bound to make
the chances of a conflict in this area much more remote. 1' While the subordination
of subsequent German legislation to Community law is not dearly established, 2 the
indications are that it will be recognized, especially in view of the acceptance of
the concepts of tranmfer of sovereign powers and of the separateness of the Community
legal order.
Finally, the relationship between Community and Italian law resembles in many
respects the German one.P Article ii of the Italian Constitution recognizes the
possibility of limitations of sovereignty on condition of equality with other states,
albeit less clearly than article 24(i) of the German Basic Law. In the case of
Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority,74 the Italian Constitutional Court re
jected the contention that certain provisions in the European Coal and Steel Treaty
violated articles io2 and 113 of the constitution which require that judicial functions
are to be exercised by regularly appointed judges. The ground given was that Community law constitutes a separate and distinct system from national law and is not
subject to certain of the restraints imposable under the Italian Constitution. But
it would appear that there are limits to the total freedom from such restraints, at
*least where fuidamental rights are concerned. 5 In Italy, the superiority of Com"' For a comment on this case, see Kovar & Tallon, supra note 67.
"' The literature on the relationship between Community and German law is extensive. For dincussion in English, see, e.g., A. GREEN supra note 2, at 388-4o6; P. HAY, supra note I, at 273-95; Hay,
supra note 28, at 544-48; E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 37-52, 2x1-5; Bebr, supra note 50 at

494-96.
"' See note 50 supra.
"' Sasse, supra note 52, at 712-13; Hay, supra note 28, at 547-48; A. GREEN, sUpra note 2, at 396-97.
"'See A. GREEN, supra note 2, at 348-88; E. STmN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 2io-si; Hay, supra

note 28, at 543-44'6
CoMm. MkT. L.R. x6o, 41 Foro Amm. 569 (965).
For comment, see A. GREEN, supra note 2,
at 384-88; Bebr, supra note 50, at 496-97.
S"See Hay, supra note 28, at 544; E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 20-I!. See also note 5o

supra.

299

NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL LAW

munity law over subsequent internal legislation is also in doubt

6

but the rationale

of the San Michele case would appear to require it.
The supremacy of Community over national law is further enhanced by the
tendency in the Court of Justice to give Community law effect beyond its immediate reach through pre-emption. Four recent cases dealing with customs matters
-Bollman,"" Waren Import7 Deutsche Bakels" and NorddeutschesS°--illustrate
this point. For example, in Norddeutsches the Court found that the Community

system of import controls relating to frozen beef was comprehensive and complete
and that there was no room for supplementation under national law through
the imposition of additional guarantee requirements. Otherwise the uniformity of
application of the Community system would be jeopardized. States may only take
measures to put the Community system into effect.
On the other hand, in the antitrust field the Court found against preemption in
the Wilh'elms ' case, relying in part on the language of articles 87(2) (e) and 3 (f)
of the Treaty. At the same time, the Court stressed that the national antitrust laws
should not be applied in a way which would be likely to jeopardize the effectiveness of the Community antitrust law. Since the Community antitrust law is directly
applicable in' the states, presumably the national courts are not permitted to authorize
or validate anticompetitive action contrary to Community law even if consistent with
the national legislation. In result, this arrangement resembles the American situation.
The impact of Community law upon national law does not end with the
directly applicable provisions of the Treaty and secondary Community legislation
in such areas as antitrust, customs, transport, and agriculture. 2 The Treaty envisages harmonization, approximation, or coordination of national laws and policies
in the areas already mentioned as well as in all areas related to the creation and functioning of the Common Market. 3 This national action is to take place primarily
The
l internal status of the Rome Treaty as ordinary statute was emphasized in the decision of
the Italian Constitutional Court in Costa v. Ente nazionale per Energia elettrica impresa gi della Edison
Volta (E.N.E.L.), io Recueil de la Cour i141, [Court Decisions 1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Comm.
MAzT. REP. 8023 (1964). See A. GwExat, supra note 2, at 348-66.
7 Hauptzollamt v. Firma Paul G. Bollmann, 16 Recueil de la Cour 69, [Court Decisions 1967-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. MKT. REP.

8098 (1970).

" Hauptzollamt v. Waren-Import-Gesellschaft Krohn & Co., 16 Recueil de Ta Cour 451, [Court Decisions 1967-197o Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8o98 (1970).
0
" Deutsche Bakels GmbH v. Oberfinanzdirektion, i6 Recuell de ]a Cour 1001, 2 CCH Comm. MFIT.
Ra.

8118 (1970).
so Norddeutsches Vieh-und Fleishkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt, 17 Recueil de la Cour 49, 2 CCA
Comm. MKT. Rap. 8132 (1971).
81
Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 15 Recueil de la Cour x, [Court Decisions 1967-I97o Transfer
Binder] CCH Comr. MYT. REP.
8o56 (1969). See, 5 Tax. INT'sL L.F. 320 (1969).
" For an analysis of the directly applicable Community law, see Bebr, supra note 3, at 257; Rainbow,
The End of the TransitionalPeriod, 6 Comm. MKsr. L. Rav. 434 (1969).

" See Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European Integration, 58 Am. J- Ierr'L L.
(1964); Vogelaar, Tax Harmonization in the European Community, 7 Comm. MxT. L. Ray. 323
(i97o); Van der Burg, The Customs Tariff and Customs Legislation in the European Communities, 7

i

Coml. MKT. L. Rae. 184 (1970); Beuve-Mery, Les applications des articles zoo, soz et 102 du traite de
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under the supervision and through the exercise of the indirect legislative authority
of the Community. It must be noted, however, that most of the national economic
legislation which affects the Community is of public or regulatory nature and the
traditionally private law domain is not significantly affected.
One should not fail to mention the important role reserved for treaties as
instruments of uniformization of national rules in the Community. Article 220 of
the Treaty envisages treaties among the member states (a) to provide full national
treatment to Community persons; (b) to eliminate double taxation; (c) to insure
the mutual recognition of companies and the maintenance of their legal personality
where their siege social is transferred and to facilitate interstate corporate mergers;
and (d) to simplify the reciprocal recognition and execution of judgments and
arbitral awards. As of the present time, two of these treaties have been signed.
One is on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons"4 and another,
which is quite comprehensive and resembles a full faith and credit clause, is on
Jurisdiction of Courts and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters. 5 In addition, a treaty creating a single Community patent, on top of the
national patents, has been drafted and has a good chance of adoption,8 while treaties
on the transfer of the siege social without loss of legal personality and on interstate
corporate mergers are in preparation!7 It was also initially thought that the statute
for the creation of a European company, that is, a company formed by domestic
companies of different nationality and subject to Community law, would be in the
form of a treaty. But in the end the Commission prepared such a statute in the
form of a regulation under article 189 and submitted it in i97o to the Council for
approval under article 235, the gap-filling provision of the Treaty which requires
unanimous Council action. The statute is presently under consideration by the
Council and the Parliament but action is not expected before 1973 at the earliest.88
la C.E.E. de 1958-7o, 6 REv. Taum. D t. EUt. 303.08 (1970); Seidel, The Harmonization of Laws
Relating to Pharmaceuticalsin the EEC, 6 Comm. MXr. L. REv. 309 (1969); Progress of Right of
Establishment in the Community, CCH Comms. Mn . REP. 9473 (1971). See also E. STrN, HAtmoNizATnoN OF EutorN ComPANY LAwS 237-312 (1971).

adopted, see, e.g., I, 2 CCH Comm. MxIT. REP.
(967), 9449, 9453, 9476 (1971), 9489 (1972).

For information on some of the directives already
3345 (1963), 336!, 3403 (965), 3450

13323 (x962),

a&2 CCH Com. Mxr. REP. 6083. See Goldman, The Convention Between the Members of the
European Economic Community on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons, 7 CoMm.
Mrr. L. REv. 104-28 (1969). See also E. STEIN, supra note 83, at 394-424.
832 CCH Com. M r. REP. 6o03 (x968). See Goldman, Tin traitd federateur: La Convention entre
les Etats membres de la C.E.E. sur la reconnaissance et l'ex~cution des de'dsions en mati~re civile et commerdale, 7 REv. Tium. DR. Eti. 1 (1971); Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation,
z6 Am. J. CoM. L. 149 (x968).
8
6Draft Convention relating to a European Patent for the Common Market, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. RnP.
4.5751 (1970) (first draft). See van Empel, European Patent Conventions, 9 CoMM. MKT. L. Rv.
13, 27-32 (1972).
8
'CCH COMM. MxKT. REP.
5252.17 (1967), 9436 (1971). See also E. STMN, HARMONIZATIO Oi'F
EuROPCOMPANY LAws 371-94 (197n).
8
For discussion of the contents and present status of the statute, see Van Ryn, Le projet de statut des
societds europeennes, 7 REv. Tium. DR.Eut. 563 (1971); 2 CCH Comm. Mitr. REP. 938! (1970). See
also, E. ftmbr, supra note 87, at 424-83.
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It is also quite significant that in certain areas, especially relating to customs and
commercial policy toward third countries, the Treaty envisages that treaties will be
entered into by the Community itself with third countries in a manner binding
on the member statesO9 This divestiture of some of the members' external sovereignty
in favor of the Community was at the center of controversy in the recent landmark
decision of the Court of Justice in an action by the Commission against the Council
relating to the common transport policy.9" During the negotiations for an extension
of the European Road Transport Agreement, a separate treaty nbt related to the
EEC, the Council had discussed and determined the positions to be takei for the Community but left it to the states to conduct the negotiations and conclude the agreement. The Commission complained, claiming that the subject matter of the
ERTA fell within the field of application of Council Regulation 543/19691 implementing the common transport policy and that, therefore, it was the Community,
through the Commission, and not the states, that had authority to negotiate.
The Court of Justice rendered a decision of major significance. It upheld the
Commission's position that the EEC has exclusive treaty-making powers, not only
in the few instances where the Treaty expressly so provides, but also by implication with respect to subject matters on which internal Community rules are in
effect. The common transport policy adopted pursuant to article 75 of the Treaty
is such a subject. The effect of this decision is to make the external authority of
the Community in substance co-extensive with the internal one. 2 While this case
does not go as far as the United States case of Missouri v. Holland3 which upheld
the authority of the federal government to regulate through treaties matters beyond
the reach of the internal federal jurisdiction, it represents a giant step in the direction
of federalization. Not only does it extend Community authority to the external
sphere, but it also recognizes the possibility that certain sovereign powers were
transferred to the Community by implication.
" Rome Treaty, arts. 111(2), 113 & 114. See generally Feld, The Competence! of the European
Communities for the Conduct of External Relations, 43 TaxAs L. R~v. 89i (1965); Bot, Negotiating
Community Agreements: Procedure and Practice, 7 COMM. Max. L. REv. 286 (197o); Costonis, The
Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic Community: The Perspectives of a Decade, 5 Comms.
MxT. L. REv. 421 (z968).

" Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Council of the Eur. Communities, X7 Recueil de la Cour 263,
OCH Cotr. MxTe. REP. 8134 (197r). This is the first case in Community history where the Commisqion
brought an action against the Council.
" Art. 7, Council Reg. No. 543/69, JoURNAL OFFPCIEL DES COMMUNAUTa s EUROPkENNES, March 29,
1969, at L77/52.
' For a discussion of the implications of this case, see Collinson, The Foreign Relations Powers of
the European Communities: A Comment on Commission v. Council, 23 STAN. L. REV. 956 (1971);
2

Winter, Annotation on Case 22/7o, Re ERTA, 8 Comm. Mxa.

L. REv. 550 (1971); Constantinesco, Note

under Commission v. Council, 7 REv. Tsuar. DR. Etn. 796 (1971).
It is to be noted that the Court ultimately decided the case in favor of the Council on a very narrow
ground, namely that the negotiations on the ERTA had already commenced before the adoption of
Regulation 543/69, with the member states participating on their own, and that allowing them to continue

under the Council's mandate was not improper under the circumstances.

93 252 U.S. 46 (192o). In contrast with the states in the United States, the rationale of this case
probably would not apply to the Community situation where the member states retain substantial treatymaking powers. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § io.
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The story of European integration in the legal sphere does not end with the
EEC. The legal systems of Europe are coming together under influences from
other institutions as well: the Council of Europe with its Conventions, 4 the Rome
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, and the Hague Academy." It should
also be noted that certain aspects of conflicts of laws may affect the Community.
The Commission held discussions on standardizing the choice of law provisions
concerning the free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers. Following
these discussions, the Commission drafted and submitted to the Council a proposal
for the regulation of conflicts of laws relating to labor contracts, with emphasis on
the place where the work is normally performed?"
III
IMPAcr OF BiarnSH ENTRY

As the United Kingdom and other countries become members of the Community,
the legal methods and consequences of their participation in European integration
cannot fail to provide a great deal of fascination. In very general terms, the situation
is quite simple. The United Kingdom and the others have signed and are to
ratify a Treaty of Accession to the European Communities. 7 While the new members were able to obtain favorable treatment, mostly for a transitional period, on
substantive matters and especially agriculture, it is not an exaggeration' to say that
they have accepted the legal system of the Communities lock, stock, and barrel and
are to be bound according to its rules.
To be sure, there are some special problems with the United Kingdom as with
most of the present member states. For example, the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is fundamentally incompatible with the concept of the transfer of
some sovereign powers to the Communities. Since no Parliament can bind its
successor, it is virtually impossible to insure that Community law will not be
superseded. internally by subsequent inconsistent legislation. 8 There is some
94see Krueger, The Council of Europe and Unification of Private Law, x6 Am. J. Comps. L. 127
(i968); Baade, The Council of Europe: Its Acivities Relating to Law, z5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 639 (x967).
"' For information on the work of these and other institutions, see Kearney, Progress Report-International Unification of Private Law, 23 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 220 (1968); Hay, The United States
and International Unification of Law, 1965 U. IL. L.F. 820.
06 1, 2 CCH Commr. MKT. REP.
3525.03 (,97i), 9498 (x972). For a general discussion, see Drobnig,
Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community, 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 204 (x967).
T

""TREATY CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF THE KINGDOM or DE mARx, IRELAND, THE KINGDOM 0P
NoRwAY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE EUROPEAN
ECONoNC COMMUNiTY AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY CoMmuNITY and DECISION oP THE COUNCIL OF
TIE EROPEAN COMIUNITIES CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF THE SAID STATES TO THE EUROPEAN COAL
AND STEEL CommusNiTy, CMND. NO. 4862 (1972). In 1971, the British Parliament voted in principle in
favor of British entry into the European Communities. In January, 1972, following the signing of the
Treaty of Accession, the Parliament approved at first reading the European Communities Bill 1972,
reproduced in full in The Tnes (London), January 27, x972, at 6. The debate on the Bill is still continuing at the present time. For some of the argumentation against the Bill, see It's a neat little package,
,and it explodes when you open it, Tim EcoNomsr, January 29, 1972, at 29-30.
"8E. WaDE & G.- PHILLIPS, CONSrITOONAL LAw -4-48 (7 th ed. 1965); E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra
,note 24, at 67; de Smith, The Constitution and the Common Market: A Tentative Appraisal, 34 MqD.
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precedent, developed in connection with the emancipation of the dominions, to the
effect -that auto-limitations of parliamentary power, supported by usage, may evolve

into recognized constitutional practice. 9 Neither the Accession Treaty nor the
European Communities Bill invoke or apparently rely on this practice. As regards
prior British law, the European Communities Bill does not rely solely on the
principle of lex posterior derogat priori but specifically amends or repeals about
fifty existing statutes to make them conform to Community law. 00 These statutes
relate to matters as diverse as restrictive trade practices, companies, motion pictures,
customs duties and procedures, coal and steel, food, produce, fertilizers, feeding
stuffs, animal health, transport, and agricultural supports and levies.
Another question relates to the direct applicability of subsequent Community law
in the United Kingdom. The European Communities Bill is drafted to indude
such law prospectively even though there is no precedent to support this procedure. 1 1 It is likely, howeer, that it will be upheld, 10 2 as0 3it is likely that the
Parliament will avoid legislating in conflict with the Treaty.
The consequences of British entry into the Communities for the legal systems of
both are bound to be considerable but not overwhelming. Community economic law
will be introduced into the United Kingdom with the consequence, for example, that
L. RFV. 597, 611-12 (1971); Martin, The Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities: Jurisdictional Problems, 6 CoaMf. MiXa. L. Rv. 7, 22-23 (1969); Mitchell, "What Do You
Want to Be Inscrutable For, Marcia?", 5 Commt,. MYa-. L. RFv. 112, 116-2o (x968). Mitchell has expressed doubts as to whether the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignity exists, at least in the form
traditionally assumed. See Mitchell, L'Adhesion du Royaume-Uni Aux Communauts, 1970 CAHIRS DE
DR.osr EuRopiauH [CAir. DR. EuR.] 251, 254-65.
ouE. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 69; de Smith, supra note 98, at 612-14; Martin, supra note
98, at 23-24; Mitchell, supra note 98, 5 COMM. MYa. L. R~v. ig-2o; Mitchell, supra note 98, 1970

CAH, Da. Er. 255-59.
In an interesting case decided May io, 1971, by the London Court of Appeal, Blackburn v. Attorney
General, 9 Comm. M.r. L. Ray. 94 (x972), a suit by a British subject for a declaration that the United
Kingdom may not join the European Communities was dismissed evein though the Court recognized that under the Treaty some British sovereign rights would be shared with others. On the possibility of subsequent
Parliaments legislating inconsistently with Community law, Lord Denning is reported to have stated
that "fi]t was legal theory that one Parliament could not bind another and that no Act was irreversible;
but legal theory did not always march alongside political reality. Take the Statute of Westmainster.
Could anyone imagine that Parliament could or would reverse it or the Acts which had granted independence to the great dominions and territories overseas, and say that we still had some degree of
control over them? Most dearly not. Whatever the theory of Parliament not being able to reverse itself,
the matter could only be tested as and when the time came." Id. at 95,
'0on why this specific amendment and repeal procedure is necessary under British law, see Martin,
supra fsote 98, at 20-2I.
...
European Communities Bill 1972, pt. I, § 2(I), supra note 9715
o Martin, supra note 98, at 17-r8. LEGAL AND CoNsmIrrlrIoNAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED KINGDOM

EuaopnAN Com mUNrsas, CmND. No. 330X, at 8 (1967). "
An interesting question is whether subsequent Community law would prevail over Acts of Parliament
adopted after enactment of the European Communities Bill but before the adoption of the Community law
in question. The answer is probably in the affirmative on a delegation theory. See de Smith, supra
note 98, at 61o-ii; Martin, supra note 98, at 17; Mitchell, supra note 98, 5 CoMm. Mic'. L. Rav. 117
201 Mitchell, supra note 98, at 5 Comm. MT. L. Rav. 118; Martin, supra note 98, at 22-23; E. SaEIN
&: P. Hmr, supra note 24,-.4t 68. Furthermore, the British judges will make every effort to interpret
away inconsistencies between subsequent Acts of Parliament and Community law. Martin, supra note
98, at 25-26.
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the British will no longer be able to call their wine "wine" because it is not usually
made from fresh grapes but from grape concentrates. 0 4 More seriously, the Com
munity antitrust laws will come into effect, which will not produce monumental
changes in present practices;10 5 the customs barriers will be abolished; the valueadded tax will be shortly introduced as was planned anyway;... and British agriculture will come under the common agricultural policy, leading to higher prices
for the consumer and a reduction in deficiency supports for the farmer. 07
Probably the greatest impact of the Community upon the British legal system
will be in the realm of judicial review and administrative law. The courts in
England do not pass upon the validity of legislative enactments but they will be
required to do so when a question under Community law arises.' 8 The scope of
review of the validity of Community administrative action is also broader than that
for national action1 9 Thus, in interpreting and applying Community law the
British courts will be functioning as Community courts following, on the whole,
continental concepts.'" This judicial review will be subject to the ultimate
control of the Court of Justice under article 177, but only on questions of law
and only in so far as validity and interpretation of Community law and acts
are concerned. The British legal profession will also have to become accustomed
to the continental type procedures used at the Community level in judicial and
administrative matters and, hopefully, will also exercise some influence on them.
CoNCLUSION

Perhaps the most significant aspect of British entry from the legal point of view
will be in corporate, tax, labor, transport, conflicts and other matters affecting the
functioning of the Common Market, and in the procedural and administrative fields
where common law and the civil law concepts will finally be brought together.
While the limited amalgamation of these two different systems may delay the
process of coalescence, it is bound to provide a stimulus for comparative studies
and the end result may be quite impressive. From the American vantage point, the
expected infusion of common law concepts and procedures into the Community legal
system may be considered as paving the way for an eventually closer, direct relationship between Europe and America. In view of the present realities of world trade,
the bridging of the Atlantic, with the possible inclusion of other developed countries,
is not a utopian dream. Rather than relying on the traditional system consisting
For the Community Regulations on wine, see x CCH Corm. MxT. REP. J613-17 (1962-1970).
See Valker-Smith & Gombos, Restrictive Practices and Monopolies: A Comparison ol Britih
and Common Market Law, 3 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963).
208 Great Britain, ParliamentaryPapers, supra note 17, at 34.
'"7 For a description of the Community agricultural system, see references in note 18 supra.
108
See E. SrmN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 64.
10
1See de Smith, supra note 98, at 602; Martin, supra note 98, at 45-46.
110 See Martin, supra note 98, at 14, 29-31; Mitchell, supra note 98, 5 Comm. MxT. L. REV. 120-24;
E.SmIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 67; CONSERVATVE PoIncAL CEmTR, EuroPE AND unmLAw 8o-8i
(1968).
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essentially of intergovernmental organization and cooperation, the Americans and
the Europeans may be sufficiently encouraged by the success of the process of gradual
economic intergration in Europe to consider using it as a model for the establishment of a true Atlantic Economic Community. On the legal plane, such a development would require constitutional changes in the United States;'11 and it is time for
legal scholars and practitioners and experts in other fields, such as political science and
economics, to begin giving serious consideration to the particular problems that would
arise and to the adjustments that would be required in such an eventuality.
...Under present constitutional practice in the United States, the validity of a treaty delegating legislative, judicial and executive powers to a supranational authority and especially empowering such authority
to adopt rules and make decisions enforceable in the United States, but placed beyond judicial review under
the U.S. Constitution, is subject to serious doubt. See P. HAY, supra note z, at 205-70; Hay, Cooley &
Moorhead, Problems of United States Participationin the European Common Market, 23 U. PTrr. L. Rv.
595 (1962).

